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EVERYONE KNOWS MEDELLIN; HAS
ANYONE HEARD OF O'BRIEN?
RECONCILING THE UNITED STATES
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
BY AMENDING THE VCCR
STEVEN M. NOVAK*

I.

A TALE OF Two APPEALS

On August 5, 2008, Jose Ernesto Medellin ("Medellin"), a
citizen of Mexico living in the United States since he was in
preschool,' was executed for the rape and murder of two young
girls, Jennifer Ertman and Elizabeth Pena. 2 The international
implications of Medellin's citizenship caused his lengthy appellate
3
process to involve a series of appeals in state and federal courts,
the acclaimed International Court of Justice's decision in Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals,4 a Presidential Memorandum, 5 and
finally, a much criticized decision in the United States Supreme
Court.6 This appellate process was based on Medellin's citizenship
and Texas law enforcement's violations of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations Treaty (VCCR).7
* The author was born in Denver, Colorado and raised in Naperville,
Illinois. After graduating from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
with a degree in History, he attended the John Marshall Law School. Steve
graduated from the John Marshall Law School in 2010 and is currently a Staff
Attorney at the John Marshall Law School Veterans Support Center & Clinic.
1. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 500-01 (2008).
2. Allan Turner and Rosanna Ruiz, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of
Houston Teens, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2008, at A2.
3. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498.
4. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 5357 (Mar. 31).
5. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at app. 2, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928),
2005 WL 504490 [hereinafter President's Memorandum].
6. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491 (outlining the complicated procedural
history of Medellin's case); see John F. Murphy, Medellin v. Texas:
Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision for the United States and the
Rule of Law in InternationalAffairs, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 247,
272-75 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Medellin will
have strong, adverse effects on the international affairs of the United States
and its citizens traveling abroad).
7. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498-500; Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations art. 36, Dec. 14, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter
817
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In contrast, Derrick Sean O'Brien ("O'Brien"), an American
citizen, convicted of participating in the same crime had no such
treaty to fall back on.8 O'Brien was executed almost a full two
years before Medellin, 9 and after a less than noteworthy appellate
process.
This contrast highlights a disconnect between the interests of
international and domestic law that will be explored in this
Comment. While Medellin and O'Brien both grew up in the United
States, were members of the same Texas gang, and participated in
a horrendous crime,' 0 Medellin's case raised international hairs
while O'Brien's did not.
Part II of this Comment will outline the debate between
international and domestic law as framed by the VCCR and its
historical application in the United States. This debate
appropriately sets the context, because the two sides have always
been the interests of state domestic law in effectively prosecuting
violent offenders against the interests of the rule of international
law for foreign nationals arrested in the United States. Part III
will contrast the appeals of Medellin and O'Brien in order to
explain how the VCCR seems particularly inapplicable-and
perhaps not worth enforcing by the states-when the suspect has
lived in the foreign country for a long period of time and would
know just as much about its judicial system as the average native.
Finally, in Part IV, this Comment will propose an amendment to
the VCCR that may make the treaty more applicable to both the
interests of domestic law in the United States and at the same
time preserve the deserved rights of foreigners-and American
citizens abroad-arrested and scared in a strange land.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A.
1.

Texas CriminalProcedure

General Texas Criminal and Appellate Procedure

In Texas, it is a capital offense for a person to-as Medellin
was convicted of doing-murder more than one person during the

VCCR].
8. See Ex parte O'Brien, 190 S.W.3d 677, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(limiting the appeal to a discussion of whether or not lethal injection was a
cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal Constitution).
9. Allan Turner and Rosanna Ruiz, O'Brien Executed for Rape-Murders,
Hous. CHON., July 12, 2006, at Al.
10. See T.J. Milling, Six Teens Held in Two Girls' Rape-Murders/'Vicious"
Youths Reportedly were Bragging in their Cells, HOUS. CHRON., Jun. 30, 1993,
at Al (reporting on the arrest of both O'Brien and Medellin and suggesting the
two were both participating in a possible gang initiation rite and lived in close
proximity to each other).
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same "criminal transaction."" In a capital case where the
prosecution is seeking the death penalty, after the guilt-phase of
the trial there is a sentencing phase whereupon the jury decides
whether or not to impose the death penalty or merely life
imprisonment.12 Pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, all judgments of conviction and sentence of death are
subject to automatic review by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. 13 Medellin's conviction and sentence was affirmed by this
appellate court without Medellin raising the issue that his right to
consular notification had been violated. 14
2.

The ProceduralDefault Rule

The concept of the procedural default rule, at action in
Medellin's appeal, is that if an issue is not raised at the trial level,
then it is waived on appeal.15 In Texas, in order to preserve an
11. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(7)(A) (Vernon 2005). To be part of the
same criminal transaction, the murders must occur in a continuous and
uninterrupted process over a short period of time. Id. See Rios v. State, 846
S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that the circumstantial
evidence that the two victims were shot in the same manner, with the same
weapon, and deposited in the same location was sufficient to support a jury
finding that the two murders were part of the same criminal transaction).
12. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(a)(1) (Vernon 2005). If the
defendant is found guilty, the sentencing proceeding is conducted before the
jury as soon as practicable. Id. art. 37.071(2)(a)(1). In this proceeding, evidence
is presented by both the state and the defendant as to any matter that may be
relevant to sentence including evidence of the defendant's background or
character or other mitigating circumstances. Id. art. 37.071(2)(a)(1). Upon
conclusion of the proceeding, the judge submits two issues to the jury: (1)
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence in the future; and (2) whether the defendant actually caused or
intended to cause the death of the victim. Id. art. 37.071(2)(b). If the jury
answers in the affirmative the above issues, while taking into account the
background of the defendant, then the judge will sentence the defendant to
death. Id. art. 37.071(2)(e), (g).
13. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(h).
14. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501 (noting that Medellin only raised his
VCCR claim in his first habeas application in state court, after direct review of
his conviction by the state appellate court). Medellin's subsequent VCCR
claims in both state and federal court were in habeas applications and
subsequent appeals from those applications. Id. at 501-02. Although Medellin
did not appeal his direct conviction to the United States Supreme Court, a
defendant convicted in state court and whose conviction was affirmed in the
highest state appellate court can appeal to the United States Supreme Court
which can review, among other things, state statutes as being "repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States". 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(2006); see Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1967) (asserting that the
Supreme Court does not sit as a court of criminal appeals to review state cases
and thus the states are free to provide criminal procedures as long as they
don't violate the Constitution).
15. See Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(noting that Medellin did not raise the issue of alleged VCCR violations at
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issue for subsequent appellate review a party must give the trial
court notice of the issue through a timely request, objection, or
motion with sufficient specificity to make the issue clear.16 The
only exceptions to this procedural default rule are rights which are
so absolute that they cannot be waived.' 7
This rule also applies to appeals for post-conviction relief in
writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court.'8 This federal
procedural default rule takes into account the effect of state
procedural rules and applies them to federal habeas cases.19 In
order to have this effect, the state rule must be firmly established
and the petitioner must not have complied with the rule. 20 The
procedural default rule operated in this way in Medellin's federal
habeas application with Texas' waiver rule as the underlying state
rule. 21 This procedural default rule plays a major part in the
debate on how the VCCR should be interpreted.
B. The Debate between Internationaland Domestic Law
Over time, both the United States Supreme Court and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) developed different
interpretations of the VCCR and the application of procedural
default rules. 22 Medellin himself was a named party in the Avena
case, which held that his conviction should be reviewed despite
any procedural default rules. 23 The ICJ decision of Avena would
become the basis of Medellin's appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. 24 Medellin's appeal would further decide which
25
interpretation would be binding on courts in the United States.

trial, so that issue had been waived).
16. TEX. RULES. APP. PROC. Rule 33.1(a); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
McKenzie, 997 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1999).
17. See Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 749-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(citing Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)) (describing
briefly the categories of rights which are "absolute" and holding that a
defendant's right to be tried by a qualified prosecutor is not so absolute as to
be unwaivable).
18. Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 674 (6th Cir. 2006). Congress has
expressly granted the federal courts habeas jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 2241
(2006). The writ of habeas corpus does not extend to a prisoner unless they are
being held in violation "of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." Id. § 2241(c)(3).
19. Keith, 455 F.3d at 674.
20. Id. at 673.
21. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 502.
22. Compare Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 321, 356 (2006) (holding
that the VCCR did not preclude the application of state default rules), with
Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 53-57 (holding that domestic procedural default rules
should not apply to VCCR violations).
23. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 53-57.
24. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498.
25. Id. at 498-99.
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The VCCR

In 1969, the United States ratified the VCCR.26 The purpose
of the VCCR as stated in its preamble is to "contribute to the
development of friendly relations among nations."27 The particular
relations at issue are the consular functions in Article 36 of the
VCCR. Article 36 was included "with a view to facilitating the
exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending
State." 28 Article 36 essentially provides that foreign nationals
arrested in a signing state be informed of their rights to confer
with consular officers of their native state. 29 The foreign nationals
are then able to meet with those consular officers and involve
them in their legal defense. 30 In addition to the United States, this
treaty governs the consular functions of approximately 165 other
countries. 1
According to the VCCR on its face, the authorities who
arrested and interrogated Medellin violated his right to consular
notification as described in its text. 32 However, this is precisely

26. VCCR, supra note 7, at 77.
27. Id. at 79.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Stated in full, Article 36(1) provides:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and
access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the
person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded
by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform
this
subunder
the person concerned without delay of his rights
paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also
have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf
of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly
opposes such action.
Id. art. 36(a)(1)-(3). See also infra note 127 (describing some of the benefits
consular involvement in a case can have in obtaining mitigating evidence from
the native country).
31. Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification
and Access in the United States: What's Changed Since the LaGrand Case?, 25
HOU. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (2002).
32. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501 (acknowledging that although Medellin
was given Miranda warnings, the law enforcement officers did not inform
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where the debate between international and domestic law enters
the picture.
At both the state post-conviction and federal level, Medellin's
claims that his consular rights had been violated were dismissed
because Medellin waived the issue by not arguing it at the trial
level or on direct review of his conviction. 33 Despite this harsh
result, the Supreme Court has held that such an application of
procedural default rules is appropriate. 34 In other words, although
the VCCR technically applies, the procedural default rule also
applies and can prevent a foreign national from raising the VCCR
on appeal for the first time. 35 The application of the procedural
default rule to the VCCR has been unsatisfactory to many nations
and has led to suits in the ICJ being filed against the United
States. 36
2. The InternationalCourt of Justice and Early Decisions
Regarding the VCCR
The ICJ has been an important institution in deciding the
course of international law since 1945 and is the "principal judicial
organ of the United Nations."37 The ICJ had twice discussed the
Medellin of his Vienna Convention right to notify his consulate of his arrest).
33. See Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. at 501 (citing Medellin v. State, No. 71997, slip op. at 64-65 (Tex. Crim. App. May 16, 1997) (explaining that
Medellin's consular issue argument was dismissed on appeal to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals because it was procedurally defaulted as he had
failed to raise it at trial or direct review); Medellin v. Cockrell, Civ. Action No.
H-01-4078, 2003 WL 25321243, at *11 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2003) (holding of
the Federal District Court that Medellin had similarly waived this issue).
34. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (holding that "absent a
clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum
State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State"); SanchezLlamas, 548 U.S. at 356. (noting that the procedural default rule serves an
important purpose in the adversarial system as the focus is on the parties to
present critical issues to the court in a timely manner). Furthermore, Article
36(2) of the VCCR indicates that the laws and regulations of the particular
ratifying state should be used in its application. See VCCR, supra note 7, art.
36(2) (stating that "the rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State").
35. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501-02.
36. See infra notes 38-39 (discussing cases filed against the United States
in the ICJ based on the application of the procedural default rule to VCCR
violations).
37. U.N. Charter art. 92. The ICJ was established pursuant to the United
Nations Charter in 1945. Id. The organization of the ICJ and its various
procedures are laid out in the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ Statute), which was annexed to the U.N. Charter's Article 92. Statute of
the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 993
(1945), availableat 1945 WL 26967.
According to the ICJ Statute, the ICJ is composed of a court of fifteen
international members. Id. art. 3. Members of the court are elected by the
General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of nominations. Id.
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issue of the VCCR and its alleged violations by the United States
before the Avena decision: first in the Breard case 38 and then in
the LaGrandcase.39
In Breard, although the ICJ issued a provisional measure
ordering the United States to stay the execution of Angel Breard,
the state of Virigina still carried out Breard's execution before the
ICJ could decide the case fully on the merits.40 After the
art. 4. The nominations are largely provided by the "national groups" in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Id. No two members of the court are allowed
to be from the same country and the basic requirements for nomination are
"high moral character" and "qualifications required in their respective
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris consults of
recognized competence in international law." Id. art. 2. ICJ judges are elected
for a period of nine years and can be re-elected if they choose to "run" again.
Id. art. 13. It also provides that no member of the ICJ can hold any political or
administrative position or maintain any other professional occupation. Id. art.
16.
Procedurally, only states can be parties in cases before the ICJ. Id. art.
34. Parties appeal to the ICJ by a written application addressed to the
Registrar of the Court outlining the subject of the dispute and the parties that
are implicated. Id. Hearings consist of both written and oral segments with
presentations of documents, evidence, and expert testimony. Id. art. 43. Any
judgment is final and cannot be appealed. Id. art. 60.
In deciding cases, The ICJ Statute generally provides that the court
should apply "international conventions," "international customs", and "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Id. art. 38.
Importantly, as will become apparent later in this Comment, the U.N.
Charter addresses the effect of ICJ decisions. U.N. Charter, art. 94, T 1
(stating that "each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with
the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party").
38. See generallyMemorial of the Republic of Paraguay, Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. Pleadings 99 (Oct. 9, 1998)
(arguing that the United States should do everything in its power to stop the
execution of Angel Breard due to the violations of his rights under the VCCR
by Virginian law enforcement). Breard had been convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373. The Republic of Paraguay's
appeal to the ICJ was merely the last step in a long series of unsuccessful
attempts to persuade the United States to reconsider Breard's case. See id. at
373-74 (summarizing the attempts of Paraguay to intervene on Breard's
behalf, including a civil suit brought in federal district court against certain
Virginia officials).
39. See generally LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27)
(holding that the United States should disregard the procedural default rule
when deciding Article 36 VCCR violations). Walter and Karl LaGrand, two
German brothers, were tried and convicted in Arizona for murder of a bank
employee during an armed robbery. See State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 566
(Ariz. 1987) (summarizing in detail the facts of the LaGrand brothers' crime
and convictions). Much like Paraguay in regards to the Breard case, the
German government initiated a similar civil suit in United States federal
district court on behalf of the LaGrand brothers. See LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F.
Supp. 451, 468 (D. Ariz 1995) (denying all of the LaGrand brothers' petitions
with prejudice).
40. See Mani Sheik, From Breard to Medellin: Supreme Court Inaction or
ICJ Activism in the Field of International Law?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 531, 540
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execution, the United States apologized to Paraguay and Paraguay
subsequently removed their ICJ petition. 41 Similarly, in LaGrand,
the LaGrand brothers were executed before the ICJ could decide
the case on the merits.42 However, Germany, unlike Paraguay, did
not withdraw its request for a decision. 43
In LaGrand, not only did the ICJ rule that its orders were
binding, it also held that if notice of consular rights were not given
in a timely fashion, the United States would be required to review
and reconsider the conviction.44 More importantly, the ICJ held
that the procedural default rule was an insufficient excuse to
prevent a foreign national from asserting their consular rights
under the VCCR.45
3. Avena and Medellin: Are the Judgments of the ICJ
Binding in a Court in the United States?
Now that both the United States Supreme Court and the ICJ
had different interpretations of the VCCR, the Supreme Court
next had to decide which interpretation would be enforceable
domestic law. 46 Medellin's case would serve as the context for the
Supreme Court's decision that the ICJ's interpretation of the
VCCR was not binding on domestic courts. 47
In light of the ICJ's Breard and LaGrand decisions, Mexico
obtained a decision from the ICJ in Avena which held that the
United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the VCCR and
reiterated that state procedural default rules should be
disregarded. 48 Medellin argued that the Avena decision constituted
(2006) (explaining that Breard was executed after the ICJ's provisional
measure was recognized yet while the actual case was still pending before the
ICJ).
41. See id. (characterizing the statement issued to Paraguay as an apology
with promises that the United States would improve compliance with VCCR
requirements through better education of officials and acknowledging the
importance of reciprocity between nations of VCCR obligations).
42. Robert Greffenius, Selling Medellin: The Entourage of Litigation
Surrounding the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Weight of
International Court of Justice Opinions in the Domestic Sphere, 23 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 943, 952-53 (2008).
43. Id. at 953.
44. Daniel A. McFaul, Jr., Germany v. United States of America, 15 N.Y.
INT'L L. REv. 119, 123-25 (2002). However, the lCJ did not specify how the
required review and reconsideration would be carried out and left that specific
decision up to the United States. Id. at 125.
45. See LaGrand,2001 I.C.J. at 497-98 (justifying their holding on the basis
that the procedural default rule had the effect of preventing "full effect from
being given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are
intended" and thus violated Article 36(2) of the VCCR).
46. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504.
47. Id.
48. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 53-57. Mexico named fifty-one individual Mexican
nationals in Avena, including Medellin. Id. at 13. Another point reiterated in
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a "binding" obligation on the state and federal courts of the United
States and that his case should be reconsidered.49 The major
question had changed from how the VCCR should be interpreted to
whether the Avena ruling was automatically binding federal law.50
In Medellin, the Supreme Court answered that question by
holding that ICJ decisions were not binding on domestic courts in
the United States.5 1 Medellin cited three treaties which could have
created the necessary obligation: (1) the jurisdictional mechanism
of the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes to the Vienna Convention ("Optional Protocol"); (2) the
U.N. Charter; or (3) the ICJ Statute.5 2 Pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, it would seem that the
cited treaties are binding on the states. 53 However, it is not that
Avena was that the United States was obligated to review and reconsider,
again in a manner of its own choosing, the convictions of the named Mexican
nationals. Id. at 72. Although Mexico had been pressing for a stronger, more
decisive remedy to such VCCR violations, the ICJ instead "balked" at doing so.
Greffenius, supra note 42, at 954. Furthermore, the ICJ found that the
clemency process was also an insufficient method of review and
reconsideration. Id.
49. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504.
50. Id. at 498.
51. Id, at 506.
52. Id. at 499. The Optional Protocol is part of the same treaty as the VCCR
and deals with the ICJ's jurisdiction in disputes arising from the VCCR. See
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 14,
1969, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (stating
in Article I that "disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an
application made by any party to the dispute being a party to the present
protocol.").
The Optional Protocol, along with the UN Charter itself and the ICJ
Statute, became the focus of the Medellin decision because only those treaties
could possibly give rise to an interpretation that decisions of the ICJ were
binding on courts in the United States. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506
(acknowledging that only the Optional Protocol, United Nations Charter, and
the ICJ statute could supply the "relevant obligation" to give ICJ decisions a
binding effect); id. at 506 n.4 (noting that even Medellin had disclaimed
reliance on the VCCR).
Interestingly, because the VCCR itself had no jurisdictional component
and was thus temporarily set aside, the United States Supreme Court
assumed that Article 36 of the VCCR grants foreign nationals "'an individually
enforceable right to request that their consular officers be notified of their
detention, and accompanying right to be informed by authorities."' Id. (quoting
Sanchez-Llamas, 523 U.S. at 342-43). This assumption did not help decide the
contested question of whether the VCCR bestowed rights to individuals. See
generally Bishop, supra note 31, at 43-58 (arguing, before Medellin was
decided, that there is "no" individual right to consular assistance in the United
States).
53. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that: "[t]his Constitution, and the
laws of the United States . .. and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the
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simple. The Supreme Court has long held that there is a
distinction between treaties that are automatically domestic law
as soon as they are ratified, and treaties that do not function as
binding federal law without a separate act of Congress. 54 Treaties
that do act without a subsequent legislative act are "selfexecuting."5 5
In Medellin, the Supreme Court held that neither the
Optional Protocol,56 Article 94 of the U.N. Charter,5 7 nor the ICJ
Land."); see also Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 426, 432 (1920) (upholding a treaty
between the United States and Great Britain which protected migratory birds
that traveled between the United States and Canada from Tenth Amendment
challenge as the treaty was the supreme law of the land).
54. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504-05 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 315
(1829), revd on other grounds United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833)).
In Foster, Chief Justice Marshall established this distinction by separating
treaties into different groups based on whether or not the treaty "operates, of
itself, without the aid of any legislative provision." Foster, 27 U.S. at 256.
When a treaty did not "of itself' operate without a Congressional act, and in
absence of such an act, the treaty then only created a political obligation,
rather than a judicial one. Id. at 254; see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888) (explaining that treaty provisions which are not self-executing
can only be enforced pursuant to Congressional legislation that give them
effect).
55. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2 (stating: "[w]hat we mean by 'selfexecuting' is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification").
56. Although acknowledging that the United States agreed to submit
disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention to the ICJ under the Optional
Protocol, the Supreme Court found a distinction between "submitting to
jurisdiction and agreeing to be bound." Id. at 507. The Court saw the Optional
Protocol as a simple granting of jurisdiction akin to compulsory nonbinding
arbitration that would require a party to show up, but not treat the tribunal's
decision as final. Id. The Court also found dispositive the fact that the
Optional Protocol contained no provisions about the effect of an ICJ decision
and specifically no provisions committing the signatory nations to treat ICJ
judgments as binding. Id.
57. Article 94(1) of the Charter provides that "each Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to
which it is a party." U.N. Charter, art 94(1). The Medellin Court interpreted
the phrase "undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ]" as meaning "a
commitment on the part of the U.N. Members to take future action through
their political branches to comply with an ICJ decision." Medellin, 552 U.S. at
492 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae supporting
Respondents at 34, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 04-5928)
(emphasis in original)).
The Court also found dispositive the fact that the sole remedy for
noncompliance in Article 94 was referral to the United Nations Security
Council. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 509 (citing U.N. Charter, art. 94(2)). The U.N.
Charter's express diplomatic remedy was evidence that ICJ judgments were
not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts. Id. If Article 94 was truly
meant to deem ICJ judgments as binding, then Mexico, the ICJ, or any other
party would have no reason to proceed to the Security Council to help enforce
the judgment. Id. at 511-12.
As evidence that neither the Executive Branch nor the Senate intended
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Statute,5 8 were self-executing in bestowing binding domestic effect
upon ICJ judgments. The Supreme Court based its decision largely
on the explicit text of the treaties59 and also the broader policy
implications of holding that ICJ decisions are binding.60 As a
result, lCJ judgments were not given binding effect within the
United States and instead became political and diplomatic
issues.61
Medellin has since been harshly criticized as a near mortal
blow to the United States' adherence to the international rule of
law. 62
for ICJ judgments to be binding on United States domestic courts, the Court
cited statements from the Congressional records indicating that such binding
effect was not contemplated. See id. at 510 (quoting A Resolution Proposing
Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Court of Justice:
Hearings on S. Res. 196 before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. On Foreign
Relations, 79th Cong. 142 (1946) (statement of Charles Fahy, State Dept.
Legal Adviser)) (stating that "while parties that accept ICJ jurisdiction have 'a
moral obligation' to comply with ICJ decisions, Article 94(2) provides the
exclusive means of enforcement.").
58. See id. at 510-13 (analyzing the ICJ statute and determining that,
under its text, ICJ judgments can only be binding on the parties to the case,
and those parties must always be states and cannot be individuals).
59. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the
Court's textual approach to interpreting each treaty); Medellin, 552 U.S. at
510-15 (defending the majority's textural approach while criticizing the
multifactor, "context specific" approach of the dissent).
60. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 517-18 (arguing that if an ICJ judgment had
binding effect, then neither a state nor the Supreme Court could look beyond
the judgment and disagree with its reasoning or result). ICJ judgments that
would override otherwise binding state law would also possibly override
contrary federal law as well. Id. (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,
119 (1933)) (holding that a later-in-time self-executing treaty supersedes a
federal statute if there is a conflict between the two).
The majority pointed out that Medellin did not identify a single nation
that does, in fact, treat ICJ judgments as binding domestic law. Id. at 516.
Almost comically, the best example that Medellin's amici curiaecould produce
is that local Moroccan courts have inconsistently referred to ICJ judgments as
"dispositive". Id. at 517 n.10.
Furthermore, even the dissent takes the view that not all ICJ
judgments should be considered binding because some judgments might be
politically sensitive and thus better suited to the other branches. Id. at 560
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority, on the other hand, insists that it is not
the job of the judicial branch to determine which judgments are politically
sensitive and which are not. Id. at 518.
61. See id. at 519-20 (arguing that even in light of the ruling that ICJ
decisions are not binding on domestic courts, the underlying treaties are not
useless as such judgments would still constitute international obligations
which would be better handled by political and diplomatic negotiations).
62. See, e.g., Greffenius, supra note 42, at 970-74 (proposing, instead of
Medellin's blanket rule, an adaptation of the Erie Doctrine to better determine
in which cases domestic or international law applies); Jordan J. Paust,
Medellin, Avena, The Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive
Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 301, 328-29 (2008) (contesting that
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III. THE DIFFERENCE TECHNICAL CITIZENSHIP CAN MAKE
A. Focusingon Medellin
Medellin came to the United States when he was three-yearsold and, despite being a citizen of Mexico, could read and write
fluently in English. 63 By the time Medellin was eighteen-years-old,
he had already joined a violent Texas gang known as the Black
and Whites, 64 which was led by Peter Cantu and O'Brien. 65 The
Black and Whites gang had a reputation for violence and members
of the gang besides Medellin and O'Brien had committed violent
acts before the Ertman and Pena murders.66
Medellin's official criminal background, before his arrest for
the Ertman and Pena murders, contained only a juvenile weapons
possession charge.67 However, certain incidents that also took
place before the Ertman and Pena murders relating to his
involvement with the gang became documented due to testimony
during Medellin's trial.66 Witnesses at the sentencing phase of
Medellin's trial testified that in the wake of a gang-related
the Supreme Court's tests for determining self-execution of the relevant
treaties was improper and that there is a presumption in favor of selfexecution instead of one against it); Frederic L. Kirgis, InternationalLaw in
the American Courts-The United States Supreme Court Declines to Enforce
the LC.J.'s Avena Judgment Relating to a U.S. Obligation Under the
Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERMAN L. J. 619, 636-37 (2008)
(characterizing the Supreme Court's decision in Medellin as reinforcing U.S.
insularity and accusing the Supreme Court of joining the Executive Branch in
"march[ing] to its own tune in international affairs").
63. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 358 (Hervey, J., concurring). Medellin
had been living in Houston, Texas until his conviction and subsequent
execution. Milling, supranote 10, at Al.
64. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 500-01. The gang members involved with the
Pena and Ertman murders either as participants or witnesses consisted of
Medellin himself, Medellin's younger brother, Venancio, Peter Cantu, Derrick
O'Brien, Efrain Perez, Raul Villarreal, Roman Sandoval and Frank Sandoval.
See Chilling Testimony in Trials/Three Face Death in Rape-Murders of Teenage Girls, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 13, 1994, at A13 (naming the gang members
who either participated in the Pena and Ertman murders or later served as
witnesses). All of the members were either eighteen or nineteen years old
except for Venancio Medellin who was only a minor at the time. Id.
65. Jennifer Liebrum, Gang Members Sent to Death Row/Pair Raped and
Killed Two Teen Girls, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1994, at A23.
66. See Jennifer Liebrum, Prosecutors to Seek Death for Young RapistMurderers, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1994, at A20 (describing an incident
testified to by a shooting victim of Efrain Perez). At the sentencing portion of
Perez's trial, the victim testified that in 1992, Perez confronted him and
threatened to rape his mother if he did not give him his L.A. Raiders jacket.
Id. The witness further testified that when he attempted to run away, Perez
shot him through the chest and shoulder. Id.
67. Texas
Execution
Information
Center,
Jose
Medellin,
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/410.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
68. Liebrum, supra note 66, at A20.
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shooting, Medellin, along with Efrain Perez, "showed contempt for
authority."69 Blood samples taken from Medellin after he was
arrested linked him to the murder of Patricia Lopez, which took
place five months before the Ertman and Pena murders. 70
On June 24, 1993, Jennifer Ertman and Elizabeth Pena were
walking home at night when they came across Medellin, O'Brien,
and other Black and Whites members drinking and participating
in a gang initiation.7 1 Roman Sandoval, another gang member,
testified at Medellin's trial that before he left the scene, he saw
Medellin knock Pena down as she tried to get away. 72 Christina
Cantu, the sister in-law of Peter Cantu and husband of Joe Cantu,
testified that the group, with the exception of O'Brien, gradually
revealed that they had raped and murdered the two girls.73
Medellin was not a bystander and played an active role in at least
one of the girls' deaths by strangling her with a shoelace.74 Joe
Cantu called the authorities and reported the crime.7 5 Medellin
was arrested on June 29, 1993, and after the police read him his
Miranda warnings, Medellin signed a waiver and gave a written
confession.7 6
In September 1994, jurors returned with a guilty verdict in
fifteen minutes.77 The next week, jurors sentenced Medellin to the
69. Id. Witnesses testified that in the wake of an unrelated "gang related

shooting" Medellin and Perez said "they could take care of it themselves"
rather than let police handle the shooting incident. Id.
70. Jennifer Liebrum, DNA Test Links Murder Suspect to Another Killing,
Hous. CHRON., May 3, 1994, at A17. Although blood samples were taken from
Medellin, O'Brien, and Cantu, only Medellin's positively matched the DNA
evidence on the body. Id. A beer can with O'Brien's fingerprint on it was found
beneath the body. Id. The authorities confronted O'Brien about the evidence
linking him and Medellin to the murder before his trial, and he subsequently
gave a statement containing the details of the attack. Id. Medellin, Cantu, and
O'Brien were never charged separately for the Lopez murder given their
convictions in the murders of Ertman and Pena. See id. (speculating that if
Medellin was found guilty the information would most likely be used in the
punishment phase of his trial-similar to what happened in O'Brien's case).
71. Jennifer Liebrum, Heated Debate/Murder Victim's Kin, Protestors
Clash/Emotions High After Teenager Convicted, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 17,
1994, at A29; see also supra note 64, at A13 (listing the gang members
involved with the attacks). Each of the gang members took turns fighting
Villarreal, the new initiate. Liebrum, supra note 66, at A20.
72. Liebrum, supra note 64, at Al3.
73. Id.; see also Texas Execution Information Center, supra note 67
(summarizing in detail the facts of the murders).
74. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501.
75. Liebrum, supranote 64, at A13.
76. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501.
77. Liebrum, supra note 71, at A29. It should be noted that in all of
Medellin's appeals for post conviction relief, he has not argued actual
innocence. See generally Brief of Petitioner, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) (No. 06-984) (arguing Medellin's case should be reviewed due to the
ICJ's decision in Avena and the President's Memorandum); see also Ex parte
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death penalty after four hours of deliberation.78 Medellin's
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.79
Medellin then made his first application for state postconviction relief based on the violation of the VCCR.80 Although
law enforcement officers gave Medellin Miranda warnings, they
did not notify Medellin of his VCCR right to notify the Mexican
consulate of his detention.8 1 The trial court held that the claim
was procedurally defaulted because Medellin failed to raise it at
trial or even on direct review. 82 With his habeas petition denied,
Medellin's next step would be to take his VCCR issue, and its
looming place in the international law controversy, into federal
court.83
B. Medellin Goes International

Medellin's subsequent appeals in federal court would
eventually lead to the ICJ, the United States Supreme Court, and
the international spotlight. 84 After his state habeas petition was
denied, Medellin proceeded with his VCCR claim by filing another
habeas petition in federal court.85 The Southern District of Texas,
Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 357 (Hervey, J., concurring) (noting that Medellin
made no claim that he did not commit the crime he was convicted of).
78. Liebrum, supra note 65, at A23; see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing some of the evidence of prior violence-related
acts introduced during the sentencing phase of Medellin's trial). In addition to
Medellin and O'Brien, Peter Cantu, Raul Villareal, and Efrain Perez were
sentenced to death for their participation in the Ertman and Pena murders.
Texas Execution Information Center, supra note 67. In June 2005, the
sentences of Raul Villareal and Efrain Perez were commuted to life
imprisonment because they were seventeen years old at the time of the crime.
Id. Vernancio Medellin, who was fourteen years old at the time of the
murders, was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to
forty years in prison. Id. Peter Cantu remains on death row. Id.
79. See generally Medellin v. State, No. AP-71,997, slip op. (Tex. Crim. App.
Mar. 19, 1997) (affirming Medellin's conviction and sentence on direct appeal).
80. Medellin v. State, No. 71-997, slip op. at 64-65 (Tex. Crim. App., May
16, 1997).
81. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501.
82. Medellin, No. 71-997, slip op. at 64 (Tex. Crim. App. May 16, 1997); see
also supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural
default rule). The trial court in Medellin's state habeas petition also found
that Medellin's claim failed on the merits, and that Medellin failed to show
that his conviction or sentencing was impacted by him not being able to
contact the Mexican authorities. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501-02. In Medellin, the
United States Supreme Court found that in only deciding whether ICJ
judgments were binding on domestic courts, they were discharged from having
to consider whether Medellin was at all prejudiced by the failure to notify the
Mexican Consulate. Id. at 502 n.1.
83. See id. at 501-02 (explaining Medellin's habeas denial in state court and
his filing of a habeas petition in federal court).
84. Id. at 501-04.
85. Id. at 502.
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like the Texas state court, denied relief due to the procedural
default rule.86
While Medellin's appeal was pending in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the ICJ made its decision in
Avena, in which Medellin was a named party.8 7 Effectively, the
ICJ ruled that the United States was obligated to reopen and
review Medellin's conviction without regard to state procedural
default rules. 88
Despite the Avena decision, the Fifth Circuit denied
Medellin's application for a certificate of appeal by applying
domestic law as opposed to the ICJ's ruling.8 9 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.90 However, while the case was
pending and before oral arguments,9 1 President George W. Bush
issued a Memorandum to the United States Attorney General
("President's Memorandum") ordering state courts to "give effect to
the decision in accordance with general principles of comity."92
The United States Supreme Court dismissed Medellin's petition as
improvidently granted as Medellin had filed a second application
for habeas relief in state court based on Avena and the President's
Memorandum. 93
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Medellin's
second state habeas petition after finding that neither the Avena
decision nor the President's Memorandum constituted binding
federal law.94 The United States Supreme Court again granted
certiorari98 and affirmed the dismissal upon similar findings.96
After a four hour delay while the Supreme Court considered
86. Medellin, No. H-01-4078, 2003 WL 25321243, at *10-11 (S.D. Tex. June
26, 2003).
87. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 502.
88. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ's decision
in Avena).
89. See Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the VCCR claims are indeed subject to procedural default rules as laid
out in Breard).
90. Medellin v. Dretke, 543 U.S. 1032, 1032 (2004).
91. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503.
92. President's Memorandum, supra note 5, at app. 2. For information on
the separation of powers controversy created by the President's Memorandum
see generally Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523-31 (explaining why the Executive
Branch cannot unilaterally enforce ICJ decisions); John Cerone, Making Sense
of the U.S. President's Intervention in Medellin, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 279, 280 (2008) (arguing that the President's Memorandum was an
attempt to use international law as a "power-grab" for the Executive branch).
93. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-64 (2005) (dismissing the
petition because Medellin's state court proceedings might provide the relief
requested based on Avena and the President's Memorandum).
94. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 352.
95. Medellin v. Texas, 550 U.S. 917, 917 (2007).
96. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498-99; see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text (discussing in detail the Supreme Court's reasoning in Medellin).
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staying the execution, Medellin was executed on August 5, 2008.97
C. Similarities Between O'Brien and Medellin

Despite their different national backgrounds, the cases of
O'Brien and Medellin were similar in many respects. O'Brien, like
Medellin, was also a member of the Black and Whites gang.98
Involvement with the gang was a significant part of O'Brien's
background and many previous violent incidents were brought out
at the punishment phase of O'Brien's trial.99 Like Medellin,
O'Brien was linked to the murder of Patricia Lopez through
physical evidence. 0 0 When confronted with this link, O'Brien gave
an incriminating statement to the authorities.' 0 Clearly, both
Medellin and O'Brien had violent histories before their final
arrests for the murders of Ertman and Pena.
O'Brien's brutal participation in the Ertman and Pena
murders is very similar to that of Medellin. Although O'Brien was
not one of the gang members who gathered at Joe Cantu's house
and bragged about the murders, Joe Cantu's tip to the police still
led to O'Brien's arrest. 102 According to O'Brien's confession, which
was given shortly after his arrest, Medellin pulled one end of the
belt used to strangle one of the girls while he pulled on the
other. 103 A piece of the belt, which was introduced at trial, was
recovered from O'Brien's home.104 Furthermore, when a crowd
gathered at the scene where the bodies were being recovered,
O'Brien was among the crowd, where he was caught on videotape
with a smile on his face.10 5 A jury convicted O'Brien on April 9,

97. Texas Execution Information Center, supra note 67.
98. Texas
Execution
Information
Center,
Derrick
O'Brien,
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/369.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
99. Id. O'Brien's prior criminal record showed arrests for shoplifting,
assault, and stealing a car. Id. A Houston police officer testified that he saw
O'Brien and Peter Cantu assault a man at a fast-food restaurant by punching,
kicking, and dragging him. Id. A witness named Gregory Ristivo, a former
partner in crime of O'Brien's, testified that himself and O'Brien had stolen
between twenty-five and fifty cars together. Id. Ristivo also testified that
O'Brien assaulted people to steal their shoes, and that O'Brien and Peter
Cantu often started fights with random people. Id. Sadly, O'Brien's own
mother and grandfather testified that he was "cruel" and "intentionally
harsh." Id.
100. See Liebrum, supra note 70, at A17 (reporting that O'Brien's finger
prints were found on a beer can underneath the body).
101. See id. (describing the evidence supporting the inference that Medellin
and O'Brien murdered Lopez).
102. Texas Execution Information Center, supra note 98.
103. See id. (describing in greater detail the confession and the injuries
sustained by Ertman and Pena).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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1994, and the court sentenced him to death in the same month. 106
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction
and sentence. 107
Like Medellin, O'Brien filed for a writ of habeas corpus in
state court that the court denied.108 O'Brien subsequently filed a
habeas petition in federal district court based on alleged errors
during his sentencing.10 9 The district court denied O'Brien's
petition and the denial was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 110
In 2006, O'Brien received a stay on his execution to review his
second application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court.111
O'Brien challenged his death sentence on the basis that the
chemicals used in his lethal injection might cause him pain and
suffering during his execution and therefore violate the Eighth
Amendment. 112 This stay of execution was lifted and O'Brien's
application was dismissed after the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals found the Eighth Amendment claim without merit. 113
Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeals commented that they
were unable to find any court that "has held that lethal injection
in general, or a specific lethal-injection protocol in particular,
violates the Eighth Amendment."1 14 In other words, O'Brien's
106. Id.
107. Ex parte O'Brien, 190 S.W.3d 677, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). While
discussing the procedural history of the case, the court noted that a previous
trial court had convicted and sentenced O'Brien. Id.
108. See id. (denying O'Brien's first writ of habeas corpus and a
supplemental application as an abuse of the writ).
109. O'Brien v. Dretke, 156 Fed. Appx. 724, 729 (5th Cir. 2005).
110. Id. at 737.
111. Exparte O'Brien, 190 S.W.3d at 677.
112. Id. Much like Medellin, O'Brien did not argue that the evidence used to
convict him was insufficient or the trial was improper. See id. at 678 (noting
that O'Brien "does not ... challenge Texas' right to execute him."). In order to
assess the validity of a claim of "cruel and unusual" punishment, the United
States Supreme Court has discussed certain factors, "such as whether a
method of punishment (1) deviates from contemporary norms and standards of
society; (2) offends the dignity of the prisoner and society; or (3) inflicts
unnecessary physical or psychological pain 'contrary to contemporary
standards of decency."' Id. at 679 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36
(1993)).
113. Id. at 683. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that of the
thirty-eight states which still allow capital punishment, thirty-seven of them
continue to use lethal injection as the primary means of execution and that
almost every single one of those states uses the same three chemicals as used
by Texas. Id. at 679-80. Those three chemicals are sodium pentothal,
pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. Id. at 680-81. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has noted that "according to the
State's expert, over 99.999999999999% of the population would be unconscious
within sixty seconds" from when the chemicals are first administered.
Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005).
114. Ex parte O'Brien, 190 S.W.3d at 680; see also id. at 680 n.8 (citing a long
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appeal had little chance of succeeding.
Without Mexican citizenship, and thus the VCCR claim,
O'Brien's last minute appeal to the United States Supreme Court
was dismissed in two sentences. 115 Accordingly, O'Brien was
executed on July 11, 2006, a full two years before Medellin was
executed." 6
D. What the Cases of Medellin and O'Brien Tell Us About the
VCCR and Its Application
Despite the similar background and near matching
culpability of Medellin and O'Brien, the VCCR had a profound
effect on Medellin's appeals process and none on O'Brien's. 117 Due
to this difference, the VCCR can seem to act arbitrarily based on
simple nationality, with no real equitable purpose.118
1. The VCCR as a "Technicality"
In the case of Medellin and O'Brien, the VCCR acts
arbitrarily based on Medellin's technical status as a Mexican
citizen, as there is no evidence that Medellin was ever
disadvantaged by not being an American citizen like O'Brien.119 In

list of cases where lethal injection challenges were dismissed).
115. See O'Brien v. Texas, 548 U.S. 927, 927 (2006) ("Application for stay of
execution of sentence of death presented to Justice SCALIA and by him
referred to the Court denied. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.") (emphasis in the original).
116. Texas Execution Information Center, supra note 98.
117. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text (explaining the additional
steps Medellin's appeals took based on his VCCR claim).
118. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text and infra notes 117-123
and accompanying text (discussing the lack of prejudice created by the VCCR
violations in Medellin's case).
119. See Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 358 (Hervey, J., concurring)
(noting that Medellin has been in America since the age of three and is fluent
in English). But see Urgent Action Re: Jose Ernesto Medellin Rojas,
AMNESTYUSA.ORG, July 17, 2008, http://amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/
actions/uaa20408.pdf (alleging certain failures of Medellin's court appointed
counsel at trial). An Amnesty International urgent action memo claimed that
according to Medellin's clemency petition: Medellin's court appointed attorney
was under six-month suspension from practicing law for acting unethically in
another case and spent time preparing and filing a habeas petition to keep
himself out of jail. Id. Furthermore, the urgent action memo alleges that the
investigator for the defense spent a total of "just eight hours" in preparation
for trial and that Medellin's lawyer's presentation of mitigating evidence at
the sentencing phase lasted less than two hours. Id. Although the memo
alleges failures by Medellin's legal counsel, it does not allege that Medellin
was unable to participate in his own defense due to any language barrier or
lacked understanding of the American justice system. Id. Amnesty
International only claims that, as a Mexican citizen, he should be entitled to
another bank of lawyers funded by the Mexican government, rather than be
prejudiced purely based on his citizenship. Id.
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short, as stated by Justice Hervey of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, "[Medellin] is by no means a stranger in a strange
land."120 Other courts have followed a similar line of reasoning in
other cases involving alleged violations of the VCCR.121
Despite the denial of his VCCR claims, Medellin was
protected by the rights afforded to all American citizens.122
Medellin's rights under the United States Constitution still
protected him from unfair treatment during his trial.123 In the case
of Medellin, his VCCR based appeals certainly seem predicated on
a technicality given the lack of any substantive showing of
prejudice in court. 124 Texas officials also view Medellin's VCCR
based claims as without merit and have been unequivocal in their
opinions that Medellin's sentence should be carried out. 125
Resistance to the enforcement of the VCCR will undoubtedly
manifest in certain cases when the VCCR is used by convicts not
suffering from prejudice. 126 This is dangerous as the VCCR serves
120. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 358 (Hervey, J., concurring). In fact,
Justice Hervey's entire concurring opinion is written with a hostility towards
the entire case as Medellin's "current successive habeas corpus application
provides applicant with much more than he deserves," and that Medellin
believes that "he is entitled to an immunity heretofore not afforded to any
citizen or nonresident under Texas or Federal law-immunity from procedural
default." Id. Interestingly, Justice Hervey is the only justice to write the facts
of the Ertman and Pena murders in any detail. See id. at 357 (recounting the
manner in which Ertman and Pena were killed).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that the defendant, a Laotian national, was not prejudiced by
failure to notify the Laotian consulate due to his background). Chanthadara
had lived in the United States since the age of six, spoke fluent English, and
indicated no link to Laos other than technical citizenship. Id. In a similar case
a federal court denied the habeas petition of a Columbian national who was
"represented by able counsel" and did not show how his inability to confer with
the Columbian consulate would have aided him at trial. Hurtado v. United
States, No. 00 CIV. 409 SHS, 2000 WL 890189, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 5, 2000).
122. See Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 358 (Hervey, J., concurring)
(stating that Medellin had access to "the constitutional rights available to all
accused persons in American courts" and that "according to the record, they
were scrupulously protected").
123. See id. at 322 (noting that the state district court reviewed alleged
violations of Medellin's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
124. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501-02 (noting the Texas trial court's finding
in Medellin's first habeas petition application that Medellin was not in any
way prejudiced by not contacting the Mexican Consulate).
125. See Associated Press, Lawyers for Jose Medellin Say Execution Violates
Treaty,
DALLASNEWS.COM,
Aug.
4,
2008,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/mexico/stories/0804
08dnnatmedellinexecution.159bb9a6.html (reporting on the views of Texas
Governor Rick Perry and the Texas Attorney General's office that the
execution of Medellin should be carried out).
126. See generally Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding that a Mexican national convicted for murder-for-hire was not
prejudiced because he failed to explain how contacting the Mexican consulate
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important protective functions, both for foreign nationals in the
United States and American citizens abroad. 127
2. The VCCR as an Effective and Useful Treaty
The VCCR is important in protecting the rights of foreign
nationals arrested in the United States who truly are strangers in
a strange land.128 In Standt v. New York, law enforcement officers
arrested a German foreign national for drunken driving.129 The
foreign national had difficulty understanding English and
repeatedly asked to speak to his consulate but was denied.13 0 In
denying summary judgment for the defendants, the court allowed
the foreign national to prove damages caused by the VCCR
violations.13 1 In Standt, it was apparent that the VCCR has the
important function of protecting the rights of foreign nationals.132
The VCCR also works both ways. By not following the ICJ's
interpretation of the VCCR, the United States risks not preserving
those treaty rights to consular notification for American
citizens.133 In general, the United States government would prefer
that American citizens arrested abroad be given "prompt,
courteous notification to the foreign national of the possibility of
consular assistance, and prompt, courteous notification to the
foreign national's nearest consular officials.""34 Certainly, showing
a commitment to the VCCR would cement the ability of the United
would have changed either his guilty plea or his death sentence); United
States v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (D. Minn. 1999) (adding that the
defendant did not demonstrate that contacting the Mexican consulate would
have prevented him from making statements to the police); United States v.
Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an alien must show
that denial of VCCR rights results in prejudice).
127. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (discussing situations
where the consular rights created by the VCCR serve an important function.
128. See, e.g., Standt v. New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419-21 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding that the VCCR applies in a civil action for police brutality
against a foreign national when he is refused an opportunity to contact his
consulate upon arrest). Again, such rights do not apply in Medellin's situation.
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 502 n.1 (explaining how Medellin was not prejudiced
by his lack of consular communication).
129. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 431.
132. See id. at 420-21 (describing the alleged abuse suffered by Standt at the
hands of law enforcement officers and his repeated requests to contact the
German consulate).
133. See Bishop, supra note 31, at 11-12 (arguing that in applying a "golden
rule" sort of approach to the VCCR, treating foreign nationals how the United
States wants its citizens to be treated, the record of the United States could
leave American citizens "rotting in prisons in Third-World countries"); see also
id. at 2-9 (telling the fictional, yet believable, story of "Jack," an American
citizen arrested in Paraguay).
134. Id. at 11.
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States government to secure such rights for American citizens. 35
IV. FIXING THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM
A solution is needed that balances the important functions of
the VCCR in protecting valuable rights,136 while at the same time
reducing the risk of using the VCCR as a "technicality" to defy
domestic criminal law. 13 7 Such a balanced solution could be
supported by the United States wholeheartedly and strengthen
the United States' commitment to the rule of international law. 138
The main problem with the VCCR as written is that it is
silent on the application of state procedural default rules.139 In
LaGrand, the ICJ determined that state procedural default rules
did not apply to VCCR violations despite such a provision missing

135. See United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d. 672, 676 n.3 (D. Virgin
Is. 1999) (noting that the United States specifically relied on the VCCR in
1979 when condemning Iran for not allowing United States diplomats to speak
with hostages and in 1986 when officials were allowed to visit an American
imprisoned in Nicaragua); Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (stating that
"[r]eciprocity is the foundation of international law" and that the United
States has consistently invoked the VCCR to protest other nations' failures to
provide Americans with consular assistance).
136. The dangers of not having successful consular relations in place was
recently evidenced by the arrest of Esha Momeni, an American student and
feminist activist, in Iran. Marie Colvin & Kayvon Biouki, US Student Held in
Notorious Iran Torture Prison, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at A4.
Momeni has already been imprisoned and has not been allowed to speak to
any lawyers or family members. Id. The United States is limited to dealing
with Iran through the Embassy of Switzerland because the United States has
no embassy or consulate in Iran. Iran: Country Specific Information,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cispatw/cis/cis_1 142.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2009).
137. See supra note 121 (listing cases where the foreign national was unable
to show any prejudice caused by a lack of consular assistance); United States
v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary or suppression rules to evidence obtained legally under the
United States Constitution); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d
882, 888 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, without more, incriminating statements
made by foreign defendants before being informed of their VCCR rights should
not be excluded).
138. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations: A Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 599
(1997) (explaining that the federal government has expressed a great interest
in seeing the VCCR upheld by the states). The United States Department of
State periodically sends notices insisting on VCCR compliance to the governor
and attorney general of each state and the mayors of all cities with a
population greater than 100,000 people. Id.
139. See VCCR, supra note 7, at 79 (excluding a provision guiding the effect
of state procedural rules in the VCCR's application); Sanchez-Llamas, 548
U.S. at 358 (holding that Article 36 of the VCCR does not suspend procedural
default rules); see also LaGrand,2001 I.C.J. at 497-98 (interpreting the VCCR
to disregard the procedural default rule).
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from the treaty.140
Without overruling Medellin, amending the VCCR to include
a provision specifying certain situations in which procedural
default rules would not apply would be appropriate. The
amendment would specify certain facts that would trigger a
disregarding of state procedural default rules when the
defendant's case is being reviewed in an appellate court.141 The
main fact that would render state procedural default rules
inapplicable to alleged violations of the VCCR is the length of time
the defendant had been living in the foreign country.142 Such an
amendment should also list additional factors that a domestic
judge could use in determining whether or not the usual default
rules should apply.143 These factors include the defendant's fluency
in the language of the country in which he or she has been
arrested and whether or not the defendant still possesses
significant ties to their home country.144
A.

Amending Treaties

Although not an easy process, a treaty can be amended in a
variety of ways.145 For example, a treaty may be modified
unilaterally by an act of Congress.146 However, because the goal is
140. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497-98. The ICJ reiterated the point in Avena
that the procedural default rules did not apply to VCCR violations. Avena,
2004 I.C.J. at 53-57; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining
the ICJ's holding in Avena).
141. See supra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text (describing the opinion of
the ICJ that procedural default rules should not apply to violations of the
VCCR).
142. Courts have found the amount of time a foreign national has spent in
the United States relevant when determining whether or not the foreign
national suffered from prejudice. See Chanthadara,230 F.3d at 1256 (noting
Chanthadara had lived in the United States since the age of six); Medellin,
552 U.S. at 500 (noting Medellin had lived in the United States since
preschool).
143. Courts have also found other personal factors relevant in deciding
whether VCCR violations have resulted in prejudice. See Chanthadara,230
F.3d at 1256 (noting that Chanthadara had no significant ties to Laos); State
v. Montano, 848 N.E.2d. 616, 622 (111. App. Ct. 2006) (finding that Montano
could speak some English, had an interpreter before and during his trial, and
had a Spanish speaking lawyer); State v. Lopez, 574 S.E.2d. 210, 214 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (refusing to allow Lopez to withdraw his plea agreement based on
VCCR violations as Lopez could speak English fluently and fully participated
in his agreement).
144. See supra note 142-43 and accompanying text (listing cases where
courts have found certain personal factors of the defendant relevant in
determining prejudice for VCCR violations).
145. See infra notes 150-54 (illustrating the ways in which treaties can be
amended).
146. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503, 508-09 (1947); Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles
W. Cox., Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934); Head Money Cases, 122 U.S. 580, 597-
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to maintain the United States' commitment to international law,
the VCCR should be renegotiated by the executive branch and the
State Department internationally.147
Admittedly, the procedural default rule, which is the focus of
the proposed amendment, is mostly unique to American law. 148
However, the other nations which are parties to the VCCR may be
willing to agree to this proposed amendment because of the
incredible amount of foreign nationals that visit and live in the
United States who may be affected. 149 If negotiations are
successful, the President may choose to submit such an
international agreement of amendment to the Senate for consent
to its ratification. 150 This is known as an Article II treaty.15 1
Another option is to modify the treaty with a CongressionalExecutive agreement.152 These agreements are international
treaties that are concluded by a general or specific act of Congress
instead of the Article II process of ratification. 153 These always
have been treated as constitutionally equivalent to Article II
treaties.154

99 (1884). However, as a matter of statutory construction, absent explicit
statutory language, courts have been extremely reluctant to conclude that
congressional statutes conflict with treaty rights. Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979).
147. See Phillip R. Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the President, The
Senate and Congress With Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the
United States, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 645, 647-48 (1991) (discussing the various
constitutional methods negotiating and ratifying an international treaty).
148. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 56 (describing the procedural default rule as a
unique component of United States law); Posting of Professor Ernie Young to
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/medellin-discussion-board-theSCOTUSblog,
case-going- forward (Mar. 25, 2008, 17:42 EST) (noting that procedural default
blocks a "second or third bite at the apple" while most legal systems only "give
a single bite at the apple, period.").
149. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 44 (recognizing the "millions of aliens" which
reside within the United States); International Arrivals to the U.S.-Historical
Visitation 1994-2000, http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2000-04-001/index.html
(last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (charting out the large numbers of foreigners
which have visited the United States from over one-hundred countries).
150. Trimble & Weiss, supra note 147, at 649. The Senate does not actually
ratify a new treaty; it merely expresses its consent to ratification by the
President. Id. However, the Senate may also consent to a treaty's ratification
subject to conditions that bind the President if he chooses to ratify the treaty.
Id. The Senate conditions may have a variety of effects, including requiring
the President to attach a reservation to United States adherence to the treaty,
to amend the treaty by international agreement with the other treaty
partners, or even to require the President to make a specified declaration to
the other treaty partners in connection with ratification. Id.
151. Id. at 647.
152. See id. at 650 (defining and explaining agreements between Congress
and the Executive Branch).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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The executive branch submits a variety of treaties to the
Senate for approval every year. 15 5 These submissions also include
amendments to existing treaties.156 The Senate has approved past
amendments to treaties that have affected international law in a
variety of areas.157

B. A ProposedAmendment to the VCCR
An added provision to the VCCR must be clear to demonstrate
the necessary intent that Article 36(1) does not allow the
application of procedural default rules in certain situations. The
proposed provision that should be included in Article 36(1) of the
VCCR reads:
(d) Upon review of the conviction of a national of the sending State
where an alleged violation of this Article is raised for the first time,
State procedural default rules or the equivalent should be
disregarded, and review of alleged violations be conducted only if
the national of the sending State has lived in the receiving State for
less than ten years. A receiving State judge may exercise discretion
and ignore domestic procedural default rules even if the national of
the sending State has been living in the receiving State for over ten
years but is still not fluent in the language of the receiving State,
still has significant ties to the sending State, or other factors.

1. The Ten-Year Residency Provision
The main provision in the amendment is the requirement
that the state procedural default rules should not be applied to the
review of alleged VCCR violations for foreign nationals who have
resided in the foreign country for less than ten years. 15 8 Such a
155. See John R. Crook, Administration Seeks Senate Approval of Eight
Treaties During 2007, 102 AM. JUR. INT'L L. 348, 348 (2008) (listing eight

treaties prepared by the Department of State's Office of Treaty Affairs and
submitted to the U.S. Senate).
156. See id. (including amendments to treaties in the list of eight treaties
submitted to the U.S. Senate in 2007). The most recent proposed amendments
included an amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material and amendments to the Convention on the International
Hydrographic Organization. Id.
157. See Kerry V. Kovarik, A Good Idea Stretched Too Far: Amending the
General Aviation Revitalization Act to Mitigate Unintended Inequities, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 973, 996 n. 167 (discussing the Montreal Convention, a

treaty adopted in 1999, which amended the Warsaw Convention concerning
compensation for air disaster victims); Joseph S. Henderson, Effect of Tax
Treaties on U.S. Activities of Nonresidents, SP017 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. 79, 108 (2008) (explaining the 1995 amendments to the United
States-Canada Income Tax Treaty which addressed a variety of issues
affecting American and Canadian estates); Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Tax Planning
With U.S. Treaties Without LOB Provisions, 821 PRACTICING L. INST. TAx L. &
EST. PLAN. HANDBOOK SERIES 229, 236 n.9 (2008) (noting that the United
States recently amended the United States-Iceland Income Tax Treaty).
158. See supra note 142 (listing cases where courts have found time that a
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provision would maintain the equitable purposes of the VCCR in
preventing "strangers in a strange land" from being abused by the
authorities due to lack of an understanding of the relevant legal
system.159

Ten years is an adequate time for a foreign national to come
to grips with the exercise of law in his or her chosen land of
residence through day-to-day experiences. Even American citizens
without intimate knowledge of criminal law are expected to know
the law because ignorance of the law is generally not a valid
criminal defense. 160 This ten-year grace period is another layer of
protection that stays the procedural default rule for foreign
nationals in case their attorneys fail to demand VCCR rights for
their clients before or during trial.16 1
2.

The DiscretionaryFactors

The discretionary factors allow an appellate judge to use his
or her discretion in examining alleged VCCR violations even when
the foreign national has been living in the foreign country for more
than ten years.
Because the ten-year time limit is by no means precise, other
factors may be considered to determine the equitability of barring
a review of alleged VCCR violations. Primarily, this includes
language and cultural barriers which could greatly interfere with
a foreign national's defense and an attorney-client relationship. 162
foreign national has spent in the United States relevant to findings of
prejudice).
159. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 31, at 6 (explaining that in Paraguay, it
greatly benefits the defendant to confess guilt).
160. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 13 (2008). It is not a defense that a defendant
is honestly mistaken in believing that certain conduct is not an offense or even
whether or not the defendant believed in good faith that he or she was acting
lawfully. Id. Exceptions to this general rule do exist, particularly when there
are due process concerns, such as notice. See, e.g. Burns v. Sate, 61 S.W.2d
512, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933) (explaining that a mistake of law defense may
be available when the law is not settled, is obscure, or is susceptible to more
than one reasonable construction); United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291,
1295 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a defense of ignorance of the law may be
available under "complex regulatory schemes that have the potential of
snaring unwitting violators"). Such exceptions would also apply to foreign
nationals arrested in this country.
161. See Gregory J. Kuykendall, Alicia Amezcua-Rodriguez & Mark Warren,
Mitigation Abroad: Preparing a Successful Case for Life for the Foreign
National Client, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 989, 993 (2008) (indicating that it is the
duty of the attorney under ABA Guidelines to provide required consular
information to clients and to notify consulates on their behalf, particularly
after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Medellin).
162. Id. at 989. Additionally, mitigating evidence is an important factor in
whether or not a defendant convicted of a capital crime receives the death
penalty. Id. at 1001. A key aspect of mitigation investigations are interviews
with life-history witnesses. Id. at 1005. Life-histories are essentially presented
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If a defendant has clearly been prejudiced by his or her status as a
foreign national and lack of consular assistance, yet has lived in
the foreign nation for more than ten years, it is still possible that
their VCCR allegations may be considered on appellate review.1 63
This gives appellate judges some discretion in enforcing the letter
of the VCCR, and hopefully will help them achieve an equitable
result.
In an additional nod to the ICJ's Avena decision, the appellate
judge's discretion would not be able to cut the other way and find
that procedural default rules don't apply to a foreign national who
has been in the foreign country for less than ten years but seems
particularly acclimated.
C. The Advantages of Amending the VCCR
Amending the VCCR would balance both the interests of
domestic and international law. 164 An amendment to the VCCR
would essentially bypass the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Medellin because that decision dealt with whether or
not ICJ judgments were binding on domestic courts-not the
Court's own interpretations of the VCCR.165 The amended treaty
language will show intent by the President and Congress to be
self-executing, and therefore, the practical effect of this bypass
would be to allow the United States to enforce the amended VCCR
as the law of the land166 while letting the holding from Medellin
stand: that ICJ decisions are not binding domestic law.167
A solution to the problem of the application of procedural
default rules to alleged VCCR violations should not be achieved by
reversing the United States Supreme Court in Medellin, but

to the jury as a humanizing factor which may convince the jury that the
defendant does not deserve the death penalty due to a troubled background.
Id. at 1011-12. One of the discretionary factors the proposed amendment
contains is whether there are significant ties remaining in the defendant's
home country. This is to take into account the effect that a lack of consular
assistance may have had a role in preventing effective mitigation in the
defendant's case.
163. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing cases were the
court took language barriers, or lack thereof, into account when deciding if the
foreign defendant was prejudiced).
164. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text (explaining how
amending the treaty would allow domestic law to remain unaffected by ICJ
judgments while increasing the United States' compliance with the VCCR).
165. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's decision in Medellin).
166. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 519 (reiterating
that when the textural provisions of a treaty show an intent by the President
and the Senate that the treaty have domestic effect, that treaty is selfexecuting).
167. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506.
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instead by amending the VCCR itself.168 Because the language of
the added provision denotes a clear intent of the President and the
Senate that procedural default rules do not apply in the certain
listed situations, states would be forced to comply. 169
States may be much less resistant to forfeiting their
procedural default rules when the treaty itself contains provisions
that simply ensure that a foreign national who truly deserves
VCCR protections actually gets such protections. 170 Hopefully,
such full compliance by the United States will preserve VCCR
protections for similarly deserving American citizens whose poor
luck or poor choices lead to their arrest in foreign countries.
V. CONCLUSION

The VCCR is an important treaty in the landscape of
international law. However, Medellin, like O'Brien, did not
deserve the protections that the VCCR affords other foreign
nationals. Amending the VCCR to include an extra set of
protections-the waiver of procedural default rules-will further
168. Not even the dissent in Medellin agrees that ICJ judgments should be
binding on American courts in all cases. See id. at 560 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(admitting that "Congress is unlikely to authorize automatic judicial
enforceability of all ICJ judgments"). Such automatic self-executing judgments
also make little sense when dealing with matters such as "military hostilities,
naval activity, and handling of nuclear material." Id. Presumably, if all ICJ
judgments were binding on domestic courts then not only would state law be
trumped, but federal law as well. Id. at 518 (citing Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (stating that a later-in-time self-executing treaty
supersedes a federal statute if there is a conflict)). Allowing American law to
be superseded by the opinion of an international court could have severe
practical effects on the United States sovereignty and eventually force the
United States to withdraw from the ICJ altogether when one of its decisions
truly harms a legitimate interest of the United States. See Sanchez-Llamas,
548 U.S. at 339 (noting that the United States gave notice of its withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005 subsequent to the ICJ's decision
in Avena); see also supra note 60 (reporting the United States Supreme Court's
finding in Medellin that Medellin was unable to find any other foreign nation
which gave ICJ judgments such binding effect). But see Camille Cancio, The
United States' International Obligations and the Impact of Federalism:
Medellin v. Dretke and the Force of Avena in American Courts, 27 WHITTIER L.
REV. 1047, 1075 (2006) (arguing that if Medellin had been an American citizen
in Mexico, the United States would insist that ICJ judgments would create
binding domestic law). Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "[t]he
judicial Power of the United States" is "vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Such supreme judicial power in the United
States should be wielded by American courts, and not the ICJ.
169. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 517-18 (recalling that when treaties are
intended to be self-executing, they are binding on the states).
170. See Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d. at 420 (allowing a foreign national who
spoke little English and repeatedly asked to speak to his consulate to proceed
with his civil suit based on the VCCR).
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help protect such situated foreign nationals. The proposed
amendment raises the level of compliance to that mandated by the
ICJ, without being forced to determine that all such ICJ decisions
are binding on the United States. Hopefully, such a high level of
compliance, strictly enforced by the United States, can reaffirm
the United States' commitment to the rule of international law,
while at the same time allowing for the strict prosecution of
violent offenders whose demands for VCCR protections make little
sense.

